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INTRODUCTION
1

Ariella came to this country at a young age and experienced domestic
violence throughout her life—“rape resulting in her [young] motherhood,
forced marriage to her rapist, sexual abuse by [her] family members,
2
[severe] beatings, and burnings.” After being left for dead, she escaped her
abusive husband, only to be placed in foster care because she was a minor
3
with no other family in the country.
Once in the foster care system, Ariella did not receive adequate physical
4
or mental health treatment. She was denied appropriate foster placement
5
and placed in a home without a separate bed for her child. Ariella’s foster
mother would withhold welfare funding designated for Ariella and her son,
and then demand that Ariella pay the foster mother for babysitting the child
6
while Ariella worked. Ariella found work at a bar to support herself and her
son since the foster care agency did not provide monetary support but
7
expected her to pay for the baby’s basic necessities like food and diapers.
Working in a bar was both illegal and inappropriate for a minor; it required
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J.D./M.P.P. Candidate (2014), University of Pennsylvania Law School and Harvard Kennedy School of Government. My deepest gratitude to Professor Serena Mayeri and Marcia Glickman for the time spent editing, discussing, and advising me during the course of
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“Ariella” is a pseudonym, and this story is taken from a case study in Rebecca Bonagura,
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Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 183 & n.34 (2008).
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Ariella to leave her foster home in the middle of the night and left her
8
exhausted all day.
As evidence of Ariella’s need for therapy, services, and a supportive
home environment, Ariella made a “suicide attempt”—small cuts on her
9
wrists that required a cold compress and band aids. The state used this
opportunity to remove her son, and the foster care agency filed a neglect
10
petition against her. In proving she was an unfit mother, the agency used
the foster mother’s complaints about Ariella’s work place, her work attire,
11
and her late hours against her.
The job Ariella was forced to have to
provide for her son was used by the agency to prove her inability to parent.
As a result of being a young mother in foster care and largely due to the
inadequacies of the foster care system, Ariella was not provided courtordered services like child care and parenting classes or the resources to
12
take care of herself or her son, resulting in her child’s removal.
Teenage parents, as both minors and parents, are strangely situated
when it comes to the fundamental right to family integrity. Minors have full
parental autonomy over their children but are constrained as minors from
signing leases, applying for public benefits, and even opening checking
accounts. Interfering with the rights of young mothers to make parenting
decisions is prohibited, but restrictions associated with foster care
placements often infringe on this right and impair parenting wards’
freedom to control the care of their children.
13
Parenting wards face infringements on their right to family integrity
that raise two types of constitutional issues: due process and equal
protection claims. The due process problems take on multiple forms. Since
family integrity is a fundamental right, the state has to have a compelling
14
interest—such as protection of the child—to interfere with family life.
When a foster care placement restricts the childrearing decisions of young
mothers in foster care, it is an unjust infringement on their right to family
integrity. Also, when the state meddles in the young mother’s life and
separates the parent and child without threats to the safety or well-being of
the child, the mother’s due process rights are violated.
Equal protection claims arise because parenting wards meet differential
treatment as a group from all other mothers when it comes to the threshold
for removal of their children and the standards used in court proceedings.
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Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
“Parenting wards” is the term commonly used to refer to minor parents in foster care.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 792 (3d ed. 2006).
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Due to the disadvantage of their age and the nature of foster care
placements, parenting wards have a greater risk of facing allegations of
15
abuse and neglect against their children. Dependency proceedings often
hold young mothers accountable for harm to their babies that is not their
fault and rebellious behaviors that do not create any risk of harm to their
16
children, while similar behaviors are not held against other mothers.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on pregnant
and parenting teens. Part II evaluates the rights of minor parents to family
integrity and the intergenerational implications of their rights. That Part
explains that although minor parents are given parental rights in name,
being a parent does not cure their minority. Due to their age, young
parents have limited access to resources they need to parent their children,
such as housing, appropriate medical care, employment, and welfare
17
benefits.
However, minors’ full access to parental autonomy limits the
18
adult parents’ authority to control their minor parenting child. The
inability to interfere with the minor’s parenting decisions ultimately restricts
the adult parents’ rights to family integrity and removes any obligation on
them to provide additional help to the young mother.
Part III of this Comment lays out the constitutional right to family
integrity and the standards the state is required to meet for interfering with
that right. The Part begins by outlining the historical application of the
fundamental right to family integrity given to adult parents. Then, this
Comment examines the traditional framework and justification for
curtailing the rights of adolescents. Minors’ right to bodily integrity in the
abortion context is used as an example to demonstrate the standard
interplay between the rights of parents and the rights of minors. Extending
the traditional analysis, this Comment argues that adolescents’ right to
family integrity is anomalous and could be curtailed according to the
justifications used in the abortion context. The Part concludes with an
explanation of the “conditional curtailment” test that can be used as a tool
to protect minors’ interests if their rights are curtailed, by imposing
obligations on the adult parents to act in the minor’s best interest, provide
support and resources, and play a critical role in her development.
Part IV explains the structure of the foster care system and dependency
court proceedings, specifically for young mothers. This Part provides
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AMY DWORSKY & JAN DECOURSEY, PREGNANT AND PARENTING FOSTER YOUTH: THEIR
NEEDS, THEIR EXPERIENCES 34 (2009).
Rebecca Horwitz et al., Protection v. Presentment: When Youths in Foster Care Become
Respondents in Child Welfare Proceedings, 2012 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421, 426.
These are de jure restrictions that vary from state to state.
Throughout the Comment, the parents of young mothers will be referred to as “natural
parents,” “adult parents,” and “natural adult parents.”
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background information on the different types of child welfare court
proceedings and the different types of foster care placements for young
mothers. This Part also outlines the changes that occur after a ward has a
baby and what protections are in place for the young mother and her child.
Part V explores the duties of foster care agencies to young mothers in
their care. Because the state stands in the place of the natural adult parent
due to no fault of the young mother, foster agencies should not be allowed
to infringe on the minor’s parenting decisions. However, child welfare
agencies have two specific obligations to children in their care: to prepare
minors for life after foster care and to protect children in care from
foreseeable harm.
Part VI explores the due process and equal protection violations that
face young mothers in foster care. Due process problems first arise when
foster care placements restrict the parenting decisions of young mothers.
The second type of due process claims arise from the unwarranted
separation of parenting wards from their babies. This Comment demonstrates that parenting wards may first face separation from their babies after
birth due to placement shortages. Then, they encounter a high risk of
removal of their children caused by problematic placements. In addition,
the nature of the placements dispose parenting wards to greater scrutiny,
penalties for typical teenage behaviors that do not endanger their children,
and coercion by social workers to place their children in care.
The Part then explores the possible equal protection problems that
arise. This Comment argues that the nature of foster care placements
means that the actions of parenting wards have different ramifications than
the same actions taken by other mothers, so the threshold for government
interference is lower for young mothers in care. Once parenting wards are
subject to dependency and termination proceedings, equal protection
problems arise because they face adult standards without access to adult
rights. As a result, they are held to standards of “fitness” that are almost
impossible to meet, effectually establishing a higher standard in court
proceedings for teen mothers than for adult parents.
In Part VII, this Comment advocates for a restructuring of adolescents’
parental rights by proposing a trade-off between young mothers and their
caregivers supported by the “conditional curtailment” test: adult parents
and child welfare agencies can infringe on immature young mothers’
parenting decisions, but then there is an obligation to provide additional
resources and support to the young mothers. If the minor mother is mature
enough that her rights should not be curtailed, she should be granted adult
access to all other rights. Even if the minor mother meets the maturity
prong, she should be able to waive the full protection of her rights in
exchange for the provision of enhanced services. In Part VII, this Comment
also examines possible legislative remedies and effective court rules that can
alleviate some of the problems.
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The Conclusion reiterates that the baby’s interests are furthered by
improving the young mother’s interests. The young mother’s interests are
improved through restructuring the framework of minors’ parental rights
and eliminating the constitutional violations that young mothers in foster
care face.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Teenage pregnancy has become a common part of our culture. The
19
prevalence of teenage girls becoming pregnant and carrying their babies to
term has even led to widespread depiction in the media. From movies like
Juno to television shows like Sixteen and Pregnant and news stories about
pregnancy compacts, pregnant teens are portrayed in the media as a fixture
of current society. Teenage mothers are no longer sent away to have their
20
babies, place them for adoption, and then reintegrate into daily life.
21
Instead, high schools have day cares, and maternity clothes come in teen
fashions. The majority of teenagers are sexually active before they reach age
22
19, which results in “almost 1 million teenage women . . . becom[ing]
23
24
pregnant per year,” about half of whom give birth. Most young women
25
who give birth elect to keep their children. Teen pregnancy is here to stay,
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Though minor fathers are undoubtedly a part of teenage pregnancy and parenting, teen
couples “are rarely married and the father’s involvement is generally minimal,” so
discussions about minor parenting become discussions about “minor mothering.” Emily
Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 788 (2000) (internal footnotes
omitted). The concepts and legal analyses presented will usually apply to fathers, but
where the analyses differ, the focus will be on the young mother. See Eve Stotland &
Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 n.20 (2006), for a discussion on how the rights of biological
mothers and biological fathers differ in the eyes of the law.
This was never the widespread reality for young mothers of color. See generally RICKIE
SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION,
ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001).
See Nancy Zuckerbrod, Schools offering day care centers, USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2007, 12:13
PM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-25-2005188448_
x.htm, for just one account of how high schools around the country are starting daycares
on school grounds.
ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF: FACTS ON AMERICAN TEENS’ SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FBATSRH.html (“By their 19th birthday, seven in 10 female and male teens have had intercourse.”).
Id.
Id.
Anjani Chandra et. al., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for Adoption in the
United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, 306 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, at 9 (1999), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad306.pdf.
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so the question becomes—how do these young mothers fit into our
established legal and constitutional framework?
The rate of pregnant and parenting teens in foster care is almost twice
26
the rate of teens not in care. “Little data is available on the number and
27
demographics of pregnant and parenting wards,” so anecdotal evidence is
necessary to identify and address their needs. The federal government
collects and publishes data on children in the foster care system, but it does
28
not include data on this “crucial subclass.” “[T]he vast majority of girls and
young women who enter foster care pregnant or become pregnant, while in
foster care, are survivors of child sexual, physical and emotional abuse or
29
persistent neglect.”
When abuse and neglect proceedings are initiated
against these young parents in the foster care system, it means that they are
defending themselves against the same type of charges that resulted in their
30
own placement. Due to their childhood experiences of abuse and neglect,
many parenting wards do not have the knowledge or resources to break the
31
cycle of abuse, so they need help learning effective parenting practices.
This cycle of abuse and neglect results in a higher likelihood for parents
who have been in foster care to have their child removed than minor
32
parents without a history of state involvement.

II. RIGHTS OF MINOR PARENTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
Troxel v. Granville and its progeny have been interpreted to give minors
the full rights to family integrity afforded to adult parents, not inhibited by
33
their own adult parents’ interest in family autonomy. However, a minor
parent’s status as a parent does not grant her access to other rights limited
by her age just because she has a child. This results in a gap in rights where
minor parents are allowed to make important legal decisions on behalf of
their children without the ability to make the same types of decisions for
themselves. There is little guidance on how to navigate this legal
26
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MARK E. COURTNEY & AMY DWORSKY, CHAPLIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN, MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE
19, at 11 (2005), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/
ChapinHallDocument_3.pdf.
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 5.
Id.
NAT’L CRITTENTON FOUND., PROCEEDINGS: YOUNG MOTHERS IN FOSTER CARE CONVENING
1 (2011) [hereinafter CRITTENTON FOUND.].
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 3.
CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 1.
DWORSKY & DECOURSEY, supra note 15, at 26.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (affirming strength of parent’s right to family
integrity regardless of individual situation).
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conundrum. Because no state has enacted laws to limit the rights of minor
34
parents, the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.
In this Part, this Comment will discuss the full scope of rights afforded to
minor parents, the impact of minor parents’ rights to family integrity on
35
their adult parents, and considerations for the baby.

A. The Scope of Minor Parents’ Rights
There is a double standard and a duality of roles where minor parents
are adults for the purposes of pregnancy and parenting but children for all
other purposes. Minor parents have the same rights to control the care and
36
custody of their children as adult parents. This means that young parents
37
have full legal custody of their children and the ability to make decisions
on their behalf in every arena of life: to consent to medical care, to apply
for benefits, to make choices about education, and to make all other
decisions that fall under the umbrella of family integrity. However, a minor
parent still faces legal incapacity due to her age; pregnancy and parenting
38
do not cure a minor’s incapacity. Becoming a parent does not emancipate
minors, and even if it did, emancipation relinquishes an adult parent’s
39
duties to her child, but does not afford a minor the full rights of majority.
After giving birth, a minor parent still does not have the ability to make basic
decisions that affect her quality of life and future success, such as entering
into legally binding contracts (like a lease), consenting to medical
40
procedures, and enrolling in school. This strange juxtaposition of rights
and limitations results in situations that seem paradoxical. For instance,
without a law providing otherwise (medical emancipation), a minor parent
41
can consent to an appendectomy for her child, but not for herself. The
young mother would need her parent’s permission for her own
appendectomy. Some states allow a minor parent to apply for public
assistance, like cash benefits or Medicaid; the state may protect her right to
privacy in the application but then insist on sending the check to her

34
35
36
37
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41

Buss, supra note 19, at, 787 n.6.
For ease and clarity of discussion, this Comment will refer to the minor parent’s child as
“the baby.”
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming the right to control care as a
fundamental right).
See Buss, supra note 19, at 787 (“[N]o state has enacted laws to effect any limitations on
parental rights when exercised by minors.”).
See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 14–15 (noting that marriage cures incapacity, but
a minor can only get married with parental or judicial approval, leaving “the key to the
minor’s emancipation . . . in the hands of adult authorities”).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
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42

parents. She is considered responsible enough to seek assistance but not
43
to spend the money wisely.
The minor is allowed to make the decision to have and keep her child
without interference from the state or any consideration of her parents’
interest in her decision. Nowhere is a pregnant teenager required to consult
with her parents or obtain parental consent before having or keeping her
44
baby. Nowhere are minors’ legal rights regarding the upbringing of their
45
children limited, “even if they give birth at the age of eleven.” In many
states, minors are not required to obtain parental consent before they
46
terminate their own parental rights or give their baby up for adoption.
Minors are allowed to make these important decisions with the same
impaired judgment, immaturity, and lack of foresight that prohibits them
from unilaterally obtaining an abortion, consenting to medical procedures,
or getting a tattoo.
Paradoxically, the freedom to be a parent also means that young
mothers are expected to fulfill adult parental responsibilities without the
47
benefits and freedoms of being an adult. Young mothers are expected to
fully meet the needs of their children and their parental obligations in the
same manner as adult parents but with fewer available resources. Housing,
employment, access to medical care, and financial benefits are all resources
48
that are necessary to raise a child. As minors, they do not have the ability
to obtain independent housing, they cannot consent to their own medical
care, they are not eligible for many vocational programs—or many jobs for
that matter—and their receipt of benefits is contingent upon living with an
49
adult.
Young mothers who are prevented from obtaining resources
necessary to maintain the welfare of their children are more likely to qualify
as “unfit” parents. Even if the young mother is a “good” parent and tries

42
43

44
45
46

47
48
49

Id. at 52.
See Marie A. Failinger, Ophelia with Child: A Restorative Approach to Legal Decision-Making by
Teen Mothers, 28 LAW & INEQ. 255, 256–57 (2010) (discussing how this contrasting
structure of rights is manifested in Minnesota).
Buss, supra note 19, at 792.
Id.
See id. at 807 (discussing the important state interest in having minors seek parental
consent prior to abortion); see also Failinger, supra note 43, at 258–59 (explaining how
minors’ rights in Minnesota are different from those in other states and illuminating
further the interplay of rights in Minnesota: a young mother may keep her child over the
opposition of her parents but cannot have an abortion without parental notification or
court order, cannot terminate her own parental rights without her parents’ approval, and
cannot give her child up for adoption without parental consent).
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 177.
These resources are considered “necessary resources” throughout the Comment.
See also Buss, supra note 19, at 805 (explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning for
disallowing these rights).
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hard to provide for her child, she may not be able to meet the needs of her
baby due to the limitations of her age.

B. The Impact of These Rights on Adult Parents
Adult parents have no voice in a minor’s decision to have and keep her
50
baby. Once she decides to keep the baby, the adult parents have no say in
51
how she parents the child and no direct authority over their child’s child.
Nowhere are they given any special standing or shared authority over their
52
grandchild. Adult parents have no right to the custody and control of their
adolescent child in these decisions, but they are still responsible to the
minor parent in every other way. Affording minor parents the full scope of
parental rights interferes with their own parents’ ability to fulfill parental
53
responsibilities.
Parents have the right to control the upbringing of their children, and
this right includes an obligation to serve an important function to guide
54
children in decisions that may greatly impact their lives. In the context of
teenage pregnancy and parenting, the state has removed the parental
obligation to guide the decisions of children. By both restricting the adult
parent’s interference with the minor parent’s decisions and affording the
minor parent full access to the protections of family integrity, adult parents
are both absolved of certain responsibilities and limited in their own
realization of family integrity. In the other constructions of parent-child
rights, it is the adult parent’s rights that curtail and limit the full exercise of
the child’s rights; here, there is an opposite effect. The right of the teenage
parent to mother her child becomes more important than her parents’
rights to control her upbringing, curtailing her parents’ rights to family
integrity.

C. Considerations for the Minor’s Child
The baby has the right to the protections of general welfare and wellbeing that all children should be entitled to. While it may be instinctual to
assume babies would be better off with a non-parent adult than with a minor

50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 792.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 806–07. See also Failinger, supra note 43, at 276–77, 282–83 (discussing different
ways rights of teen mothers impact their parents’ rights).
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (discussing parental obligations in the
context of education). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1979) (discussing
parental duty to guide child development).
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55

parent, this is not necessarily the case. Research shows that outcomes for
children are better if they remain in their home with their biological
56
parents. Removal is traumatic for children, regardless of the situation, and
57
can have long-term negative effects. Even accounting for the current harm
or limitations the child faces in the home, removal often results in a worse
58
outcome and always takes a negative emotional toll on the child.
There may be a real psychological value to the baby remaining in the
59
home and growing up with a sense that she belongs. In fact, “[t]he young
child has at least as strong an interest as the minor parent in the proprietary
60
conception of parental rights” since the baby may benefit more from
remaining with her biological mother than the young mother benefits from
raising a child at such a young age.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS
Almost one hundred years ago, Meyer v. Nebraska determined that parents
61
have a fundamental right to control the care and custody of their children.
This has been widely interpreted to mean that parents have great leeway to
guide the upbringing of their children and to make parenting decisions that
impact their children’s life trajectory. While this freedom is not absolute
since the state can interfere with this right to protect the welfare of the
62
child, the right to family integrity has become one of the most recognized
and highly protected fundamental rights.
In this Part, the Comment will outline the Fourteenth Amendment right
to family integrity and explain different ways to analyze adolescent rights.
The complexity of adolescent rights will be examined under the traditional

55
56

57

58
59
60
61
62

See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 61 (“[I]t is possible that a narrow focus on
children’s rights has led advocates to overlook the plight of parenting wards.”).
There is a huge school of thought behind this research that promotes preserving the
family over removing the child due to the long-term traumatic effects of removal. Florida
has recently reformed its foster care system to ameliorate the traumatic effects of removal.
See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996), for the leading arguments in this area.
Id. at 19–20 (stressing the importance of continuity of relationships and the problems
associated with discontinuities. A child’s removal from her biological parents to a foster
home is a type of “discontinuous” relationship that has negative implications.).
Id. at 11–12 (This is true particularly in the context where the child is removed from the
“psychological parent” with whom they share an emotional bond.).
Buss, supra note 19, at 825.
Id. at 826.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (holding that parents have a
fundamental right to direct upbringing of their children by controlling their education).
See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (deciding that the state
could interfere with a parent’s control of their child when they force a child into labor).
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analysis, in the abortion context, with regards to family integrity, and
utilizing the “conditional curtailment” test.

A. Protection of Family Integrity and Parental Rights
A parent’s right to raise her children in the manner she sees fit has been
63
protected as a fundamental right for almost a century. It has become one
of the strongest rights implied from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and interference with the right to family integrity
requires intermediate scrutiny analysis where the government must show a
64
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children.
If the
government has a compelling interest to infringe on a parent’s right, the
65
means of infringement must be necessary to achieve the compelling goal.
The freedom to regulate the upbringing of one’s children allows parents
to make decisions affecting almost every area of their children’s lives with
66
great latitude and few restrictions. Thus, “[t]he primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
67
enduring American tradition.” The most recent delineation of these rights
came in Troxel v. Granville. In Troxel, the grandparents of the Troxel
children wished to have increased visitation with their grandchildren, but
Tommie Granville, the children’s biological mother, would not allow the
68
liberal visitation they desired. The Washington Superior Court granted the
69
Troxels visitation with the children over Granville’s express objection. The
Supreme Court held that decisions such as who the children could visit with
and when fell within the protected category of family integrity and that the
judgment was an unconstitutional infringement on Tommie Granville’s

63

64
65

66

67
68
69

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (contrasting the Spartan child-rearing system of removing boys
from their parents at age seven with the American system and noting that “[a]lthough
such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas
touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest.”).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (shaping the standard for governmental
interference with theright to family integrity).
The typical four-prong analysis asks (1) Is there a fundamental right? (2) Is the
constitutional right infringed? (3) Is there sufficient justification for the government’s
infringement of the right? (4) Is the means sufficiently related to the purpose?
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 794–97.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (allowing parents to educate their
children outside of state-approved schools); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925) (holding that parents may choose to enroll their children in nonpublic
education); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400–02 (allowing parents to enroll their children in foreign
language instruction).
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 8 n.25 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
Id. at 62.
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fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
70
In addition, the plurality ruled that the
control of her two daughters.
biological mother’s decision should receive deference in accordance with
71
the assumption that parents act in the best interests of their children.
Courts generally assume that parents make decisions with their children’s
welfare in mind and that parents are better situated than other individuals
to make decisions that will positively impact their children’s growth and
72
development.
The Troxel Court found that the intermediate scrutiny test should be
applied to balance a parent’s right to raise her child with the state’s role as
parens patriae in protecting the welfare of children without requiring a
73
narrow tailoring of the means like strict scrutiny. The plurality in Troxel
held that
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
74
children.
Though the Troxel Court was split in its decision, every Justice affirmed the
“long-standing jurisprudence” that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes undue interference in raising, nurturing,
75
and educating children.
Though the Court has been liberal in its provision of autonomy to
parents, the right of family integrity is not absolute or without review. The
state may interfere with and abrogate that right where necessary to protect
76
children from harm.
If a parent’s decisions or inaction pose a serious
threat to the welfare of the child, a higher degree of governmental intrusion
77
is warranted.
Because a “natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more
70
71
72
73

74
75
76
77

Id. at 72.
Id. at 68.
Buss, supra note 19, at 805 (interpreting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67–73. Note that Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment,
advocated for a strict scrutiny analysis of laws infringing on the fundamental rights of
parents. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Though the Supreme Court has ruled that
the constitutional standard for infringement on family integrity is intermediate scrutiny,
that is the minimal standard allowed, and many states require heightened scrutiny for
infringement. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 20.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 9 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that the state can encroach
on First Amendment religious liberties of children further than those of adults).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982).
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78

precious than any property right,” parents have a right to a hearing on
parental fitness and cannot be denied custody based solely on a
79
presumption or stereotype. The state is allowed to completely sever the
highly protected right of family integrity only if it finds the custodial parent
80
unfit by a clear and convincing standard of evidence. The state has a high
bar to meet to justify intrusion into the sacred realm of family life. Unless a
parent’s actions are egregious or pose considerable harm to the child, the
state affords her autonomy and exclusive control over decisions dictating the
child’s upbringing.

B. Adolescents’ Rights
To better understand minors’ rights as parents and how these rights
compare to other adolescent rights, Section B will explore the traditional
analysis of adolescent rights, minors’ rights to abortion, the uniqueness of
minors’ rights to family integrity, and the “conditional curtailment” test that
arises in this context.

1. Traditional Analysis
It is widely known and easily recognized that minors are not afforded the
same rights as adults. Age limitations impact even some of the most routine
activities: driving a car, getting into “R”-rated movies, purchasing alcohol,
and voting. The complete realization of rights does not come until an
individual achieves the age of majority. Young people do have rights of their
81
own, including due process rights, but even these are limited.
The
82
curtailment of these rights is usually justified by children’s minority. Agebased distinctions are only justified if they serve important state interests and
83
the state interest is linked to children’s special development status. The

78
79
80
81

82

83

Id. at 758–59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (finding that a biological father could not
be presumed an unfit parent simply because he was a man).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (granting minors the right to due process and the
right to an attorney in criminal proceedings); Sarah Katz, When the Child Is a Parent:
Effective Advocacy for Teen Parents in the Child Welfare System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 542
(2006) (elaborating further to explain that “[r]ather than carving out affirmative rights
for children, the United States Supreme Court has carved out a series of protections”).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (justifying restrictions on
contraceptive access to minors and reaffirming that minors are not entitled to the same
rights as adults).
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976) (holding that
the “state has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults” where the state has a “significant state interest” that is “not present in the case of
an adult”).
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Court has continually held that the constitutional rights of minors can be
curtailed due to three governmental interests: to protect minors from
vulnerability, to help minors make critical and mature decisions, and to
84
defer to the parents’ important role in guiding the minors’ upbringing.
The Court often cites minors’ impaired decision-making capacity when
85
curtailing their rights, but the Court cannot limit minors’ rights solely
because it has concerns about their capacity to make decisions. The longterm implications of a minor’s decisions also come into consideration;
restrictions on rights are accepted when a minor’s decision could have a
severe, long-term impact on her or someone else. Because the Court is
concerned with the ability of minors to make informed, mature, and
reasoned decisions, the state acts in a paternalistic capacity by limiting
minors’ freedom of choice when “bad” decisions could have negative
ramifications long into the future. Emily Buss clarifies the state’s interest in
preventing minors’ exercise of these rights:
[T]he state has a particularly strong interest in preventing minors from
exercising decision making authority over the very issues for which adults
are afforded the greatest constitutional protection. We protect the right
of an adult to make autonomous decisions about the matters that will
most affect the course of his life, but it is precisely those decisions that we
86
fear entrusting to children.
In addition, parents’ fundamental right to control the custody and care
of their children comes with an obligation to provide for and protect the
rights of their children. Without the strong interest in development and the
guiding role of parents, the justification for restricting minors’ rights and
the framework of restrictions would fall apart. Without an obligation on
parents to fill the gaps between restricted adolescent rights and the full
realization of rights, curtailments would end up being deprivations instead
of simply restrictions.
It is these three major concerns—minors’ vulnerability to pressure,
inability to make critical decisions, and need for guidance in the decisionmaking process—that lead courts to decide that minors may only make
decisions that have short-term implications.

84
85

86

This three-pronged justification was first articulated in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979).
See Buss, supra note 19, at 799–805 (discussing differences in cognitive development
between adolescents and adults and how the Court has used the assumption of impaired
decision making to justify the curtailment of rights based on age).
Id. at 802.
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2. Minors’ Rights in the Abortion Context
Abortion is one of many contexts where minors’ rights are curtailed.
While the Court has held that all females have a right to abortion and bodily
87
integrity regardless of age, a minor’s full realization of that right cannot be
obtained solely through her independent decision. Adolescent girls’ rights
are restricted due to their minority status because (1) the decision has a
long-term impact, (2) the adult parents’ right to family integrity entitles
them to guide the upbringing of their daughters and thus the decision
whether or not to have an abortion, and (3) the parents are expected and
obligated to act in their daughters’ best interest due to the limitation of
88
rights.
Since adolescent rights to abortion fit neatly into the standard
framework of adolescent rights and the traditional application of the right to
family integrity, it is a valuable springboard for evaluating and comparing
minors’ parental rights.
The right of minors to obtain abortions is an area where a fundamental
liberty interest of a minor is mitigated by a fundamental liberty interest of
her parent. The competing right of the parent to family integrity and the
state’s interest in making sure parents are notified of the abortion weigh
89
against her right. In the abortion context, the compelling interest of the
state is closely connected to parental rights to family integrity. Since the
parents have a constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit, the
state has an interest in making sure parents are aware of their daughter’s
90
decision to have an abortion.
The Court is also concerned about the impaired decision-making ability
of the young mother and the serious, long-term implications of her
91
decision. The Court compromises minors’ rights to bodily integrity due to
the weight of the decision and the need for parental involvement in this type
of decision. The substantial justification results in curtailment of the young
girl’s rights. Along with the curtailment comes an obligation on the parents
92
to provide for the child (inherent in the right to family integrity).
This is a strong example of the traditional construction of adolescents’
rights. The curtailment is based on the impaired decision-making capacity
of the minor, the respect for an adult parent’s interest in family integrity,
and the prominent role parents are expected to play in their children’s life-

87
88
89
90
91
92

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (providing for the fundamental right to bodily integrity
for women).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–37 (1979).
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 635–36.
Id. at 634–37.
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shaping decisions. The parent’s right to raise her children does not trump
93
the minor’s fundamental right, but only curtails it.

3. Family Integrity in the Adolescent Rights Framework
Under the three justifications typically used to curtail adolescents’ rights,
infringement on the right to family integrity is justified. Under the first
justification, a minor’s decision to have a child of her own falls into the
category of far-ranging consequences that the Court typically does not leave
94
to minors.
Arguably even more than the decision not to have a child
would impact the rest of her life, the decision to have a child has longreaching implications for both a young mother and her baby. Under the
second thread of reasoning, the minor’s adult parents have an interest in
controlling the upbringing of their child, including whether or not the child
becomes a parent. Indeed, the adult parents are allowed to exercise some
control over the minor’s decision to have (or not to have) a child. Under
the final justification for curtailment, the role of the adult parents once their
child has a baby is at least as important as before the birth, and their role is
no less important than during their daughter’s decision whether to have an
abortion. Indeed, the adult parents’ role and obligation in guiding the
child’s transition to adulthood and parenthood seem as important, if not
more important, than their role in the abortion decision. Due to these
justifications, under the traditional application of adolescent rights, a
minor’s right to family integrity would be curtailed, but her parents would
be expected to fill any gaps that might result.

4. “Conditional Curtailment” Test
The traditional analysis courts engage in to justify restricting adolescent
rights while protecting minors through obligations on the parents can be
distilled into a “conditional curtailment” test: (1) if minors are not mature
enough to make decisions that will impact the rest of their lives, (2) then
parents have an obligation to act in the best interest of their children and
play a critical role in filling any gaps the curtailment might leave. The

93

94

Since teen girls have the right to abortion, there must be a judicial bypass procedure to
circumvent parental consent or notification if necessary. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 649–50. See also H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (clarifying that as long as parents do not have veto power
over the abortion decision, mandatory parental notification for minors is acceptable).
Buss opines that this differing allocation of rights and the ability to decide to bear a child
may be because parenting goes to the question of personhood, though it seems that
abortion and the right to bodily integrity would also speak to personhood. Buss, supra
note 19, at 823.
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justification is strengthened if the parents’ right to family integrity cannot be
fulfilled without curbing the minor’s rights. This analysis holds true for
other contexts involving minors’ rights such as commitment to a mental
institution and enrolling in school. In contrast, a minor’s rights as a parent
are not curbed according to the “conditional curtailment test”; even if the
first prong is fulfilled, curtailment and the resulting obligations on the
parents do not follow. This test is helpful in understanding what concurrent
obligations would have to be imposed to protect young mothers if their
rights to family integrity were curtailed under the traditional justifications.

IV. FOSTER CARE AND THE DEPENDENCY SYSTEM FOR YOUNG MOTHERS
With a foundational understanding of the rights of young mothers and
how rights to parental integrity are situated among other adolescent and
fundamental rights, it is important to understand how the foster care system
impacts minor parents’ enjoyment of these rights. In order to fully explore
the challenges presented to parenting wards, this section will explain the two
major systems at play: dependency courts and foster care agencies.
A child alleged to be abused or neglected goes through court
proceedings to enter foster care. Once the child is under the court’s
95
supervision, the court holds regular hearings to review the case. While the
child is in foster care, the child welfare agency may provide a place for the
96
child to live and provides services to address any needs of the family.
Ideally, these two systems work together to support the best interests of the
foster child and protect her from unnecessary harm. Though the exact
nature of the proceedings, the process for removal, and the detailed
functioning of the child welfare agency vary from state to state, the same
97
basic format is used nationally.
In this Part, this Comment will outline the standards and general
processes of dependency courts. Then, this Comment will explain foster
care placements and what happens when a ward of the state has a baby.

A. Dependency Court Proceedings
Families become involved in the child welfare system after an individual
or a “mandated reporter” places a report of suspected child abuse or

95

96
97

How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO GATEWAY 7 (May 2012), available
at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf (these hearings are
typically referred to as “permanency hearings”).
Id.
Id. (laying the framework for nationally required guidelines and notes where procedures
vary according to state).
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98

Child welfare agencies investigate the allegations, but the
neglect.
expediency of these investigations depends on the nature of the
99
allegations. If the agency has genuine concerns about the welfare of the
child and evidence to support its concerns, the agency can file a dependency
100
petition with the court.
Some children are removed from their homes
during the investigation due to concerns that the children are being harmed
101
or because there is a threat of immediate harm.
If the child is not
removed because the risk is not immediate, the court will hold an
102
adjudication hearing after proper notice is given to the parents.
The state must have a compelling interest to interfere with a parent’s
right to family autonomy under parens patriae to protect the welfare of
103
children.
Since this is an interference with a fundamental right, there are
104
processes in place to protect parents’ rights.
Even though a fundamental
105
right is at stake, parents are not guaranteed representation in the two
106
types of dependency proceedings—adjudication and termination.
At an adjudication hearing, a child can be adjudicated “dependent”
107
based on a finding of abuse or neglect.
This is a full, adversarial
proceeding that follows the rules of evidence. Each state has grounds for
finding a child “dependent,” such as abandonment, physical abuse, and
108
failure to provide basic life necessities.
Most importantly, adjudication
98

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

106
107

108

How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, at 2–3 (May 2012),
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf. A “mandated
reporter” is someone such as a teacher or doctor who is required by law to report suspected instances of abuse or neglect when they encounter it in their profession.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from
Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 540 (2009).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28–30 (1981).
After Lassiter, parents are not guaranteed representation under federal law, but many
states have enacted laws to guarantee counsel to parents during these proceedings under
the belief that protecting family interests is just as important as the protection of bodily
freedom that guarantees adults the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Id. at 32–34.
Noonan et al., supra note 102.
See How the Child Welfare System Works, supra note 95 (stating that if the judge finds at the
adjudication hearing that maltreatment occurred, the child comes under jurisdiction of
the court, which makes the child a “dependent” child in most states).
See Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.pdf (Feb. 2011)
[hereinafter Definitions] (presenting civil definitions that determine grounds for
intervention by state child protective agencies); see also Grounds for Involuntary Termination
WELFARE
INFO.
GATEWAY,
available
at
of
Parental
Rights,
CHILD
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (Feb.
2010) [hereinafter Grounds] (discussing process by which state ends parent-child
relationship).
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hearings do not use a best interest standard where the judge has discretion
109
There must be some clear
to decide what would be best for the child.
level of harm or risk of harm to the child at the hands of the parents that
110
warrants the state’s interference.
If a child is adjudicated dependent, the child welfare agency assumes
supervision of the child and sets goals for the parents to help remedy the
111
problems found in the home.
The disposition phase of the adjudication
hearing determines where a dependent child will live. Adjudicating a child
dependent does not mean she is automatically removed from the home; in
fact, many children remain with their parents under state supervision with
112
services in place.
However, many courts remove the dependent children
113
to place them in foster homes or with relatives.
Once a child is considered dependent, the parents have less than two
years to meet the goals set by the child welfare agency to restore their rights
114
before a petition to terminate their rights is filed.
These goals often
include completion of drug and alcohol treatment, maintaining stable
115
housing, and securing gainful employment. If the child is under the child
welfare agency’s supervision for fifteen out of twenty-two months, the agency
must file to terminate the parent’s rights unless the parent meets one of the
116
exceptions set by federal law.
Parents have a right under Stanley v. Illinois
117
to a hearing on parental fitness before their rights can be terminated. At a
termination hearing, the state has to show by clear and convincing evidence
118
that the parent is unfit.
Each state has its own grounds for termination.
Many grounds include failure to address the root problems that brought the
119
child into care and failure to maintain a relationship with the child.
The
120
grounds are often proven by the parent not meeting state-mandated goals.
If the state proves the grounds, the parent’s rights to family integrity with
regard to this particular child or children are permanently terminated.
109

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (requiring “reasonable efforts to maintain the family unit and prevent the unnecessary removal of a child from
his/her home, as long as the child's safety is assured.” The “reasonable efforts” provision
and other aspects of ASFA emphasize the safety of the child and make safety the standard
for dependency court proceedings, not best interests.).
See id.
See How the Child Welfare System Works, supra note 95, at 5 (laying the framework for nationally required guidelines and notes where procedures vary according to state).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c) (2002).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
See Definitions, supra note 108, and Grounds, supra note 108.
See Grounds, supra note 108.

1240

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:4

Termination of parental rights is, of course, the ultimate infringement.
“The Court has repeatedly characterized state interference with parental
rights in dependency proceedings as compromising a liberty interest so
121
important as to guarantee heightened due process.” Though adjudication
is not as severe or permanent as termination, all dependency proceedings
interfere with a parent’s right to control the custody of her child and young
mothers’ rights must be protected in these processes.

B. Foster Care Placement
If a dependent child is placed into foster care, there are varying types of
placements she could enter depending on her needs that get progressively
more restrictive in nature. Foster homes and kinship care (living with a
relative or family friend) allow her to live in a traditional family setting.
Congregate care facilities include group homes, which are residences with
up to twelve children and a few foster care providers, and residential
treatment facilities that are more institutionalized and comparable to
boarding schools. The highest level of care is for children with severe
122
emotional or behavioral problems similar to a mental health hospital.
The child welfare agency must try to place the child in the least restrictive
123
setting possible, or in the setting that is the most home-like.
This means
that a young child with no behavioral or mental health problems should be
placed in a foster home instead of a residential treatment facility, while a
child who continues to run away from placement should be placed in a
residential treatment facility. As the child’s problems or needs increase, she
may need a more restrictive placement.
If a young girl becomes pregnant while in care, it is likely that her foster
home or group home is not a mother-child placement. In that case, she
must be moved to a placement that will allow her and the baby to live
124
together.
During her pregnancy she may be transferred to a maternity
group home, which is not a mother-baby placement but is only a temporary
placement that offers prenatal care and support. This means that where an
expectant mother is placed in anticipation of her baby’s birth is usually not
125
where she will be placed with her baby.
Also, though agencies usually

121
122
123
124
125

Katz, supra note 81, at 540. See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48 (requiring clear and
convincing evidence to terminate parental rights).
FORDHAM INTERDISCIPLINARY PARENT REPRESENTATION PROJECT, GUIDE TO WORKING
WITH YOUNG PARENTS IN OUT OF HOME CARE 9 (2012).
Id. at 6.
CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 8.
See YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN: IMPROVING THE FOSTER
CARE SYSTEM FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 11–15 (1995), available at
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strive to transfer the expectant mother almost immediately when the
pregnancy begins, the transfer often happens several months into the
pregnancy with little time to get settled before the young mother has to
126
move again.

C. When the Ward Has a Baby
Since young mothers enjoy the protections of family integrity, their
babies cannot be removed from their custody and placed into foster care
simply because the mother is a minor or in foster care herself. Removing
the baby based solely on the mother’s age or status as a ward would result in
infringement of parental rights based on both a stereotype and status, and
Stanley requires an underlying basis beyond status or stereotype to justify
127
infringement.
The federal government makes retaining the baby in the
custody of the parenting ward a primary goal and provides incentives not to
128
infringe on her rights.
The babies of teenagers in foster care are not
129
automatically under the care of the dependency system
and are not
themselves considered wards of the state upon birth. Federal law mandates
that “only in situations where the baby is found dependent [through the
abuse or neglect of the parent] is it appropriate for the teen parent and
130
child to be separated.”
Federal law and regulations regarding Title IV-E funds, the federal
funding stream for foster care agencies, provide that when an infant is born
to a teen in foster care, not only should the child not be removed without
evidence of child maltreatment, but the young mother and the child should
131
reside together.
Then, payments made by the state to the foster home or
132
residential facility must include maintenance for the infant’s support.
If
the state removes the baby, the state may not use federal foster funds to

126
127

128
129
130

131
132

http://www.youthadvocacycenter.org/pdf/CaringforOurChildren.pdf
(discussing
placement options and procedures for teen mothers in foster care).
Id. at 7 (quoting from the experiences of a task force of teen mothers in foster care).
See Katz, supra note 81, at 536 (relaying the story of W.B. and her child’s automatic
removal upon birth). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654–58 (1972) (asserting
that there must be an underlying basis beyond status or stereotype to justify infringement
of parental rights).
See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10–13 (discussing federal law and policy
designed to encourage continued physical custody for mothers in foster care).
Katz, supra note 81, at 550.
Id. at 551. See also Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 12 (explaining that states
jeopardize their federal subsidies if they separate mothers in foster care from their
children for reasons other than voluntary placement or finding that remaining in a young
mother’s care is contrary to infant’s welfare).
See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10–11 (analyzing provisions in 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(4)(B) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(j) (2011)).
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10.
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support the baby unless the separation is sanctioned by a court order
133
Children of teen mothers
through a finding that the baby is dependent.
in foster care are also eligible for other assistance that incentivizes keeping
the mother and baby together, such as Medicaid and Title XX Social
134
Services Block Grant funds.
In addition, the Child Welfare Act of 1980 conditions funding for foster
135
care reimbursements on the federal requirement of “reasonable efforts.”
The “reasonable efforts” provision requires that when the state is
administering child protective services it must either (1) “prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,” or (2) if
removed, “make it possible for the child to return home” as soon as
136
possible.
The effort made toward the goal of prevention or reunification
137
needs to be “reasonable.” This means that if a young mother in foster care
faces allegations of abuse or neglect, she is entitled to efforts by the child
welfare agency to keep the baby with her in the home prior to removal or
138
reunification services immediately upon removal.
Dependency courts provide legal oversight when foster care agencies
intrude on parents’ rights to protect children from harm. Adjudication,
disposition, and termination proceedings include protections for parental
rights while also maintaining the safety of children. When a young mother
is in foster care, her placement situation becomes particularly challenging,
but the state cannot remove the baby from her care without a finding of
abuse or neglect. Not only does the child welfare agency have to respect a
young parenting ward’s right to family integrity, but there are many
resources available to support the mother and baby while in placement.

V. THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
The structure of parent-child rights becomes even more complicated
139
when the adult parent is not actually a parent, but the state. According to
the parens patriae doctrine, once the state becomes the custodian and
guardian of a minor who lacks proper care and custody from her parents,
the foster care agency must ensure that decisions are made with the child’s

133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 12.
See id. at 10–12 for a discussion of federal funding streams and their availability to
children of minor parents in care.
Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal
Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 270 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
When discussing a minor’s rights in the foster care system, “the state” refers to the
appropriate county or state foster care agency with jurisdiction over the child.
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best interests in mind. The foster care agency stands in the place of the
140
natural parents and should act as an adult parent would.
The legal relationship between the foster care agency and the minor
parent mirrors the relationship between the natural adult parents and their
minor parenting child. The foster care agency has control over the care and
custody of the minor parent, but not over the baby. The state may limit the
parenting ward’s freedom in ways that natural adult parents can, including
setting curfews and selecting medical providers for the ward, but it is not
141
supposed to impose on the minor’s parenting decisions.
While there are many parallels between the state’s role as parens patriae
and the adult parents’, there are two additional obligations placed on foster
care agencies. Foster care agencies are required by law to help older youth
142
in foster care prepare for life after they leave care, and the state has a duty
143
to prevent harm to children in its care.

A. Preparing the Minor Parent for Life After Foster Care
Federal law creates an affirmative duty on the state to provide services
and a plan to help young mothers live on their own after they transition out
144
of foster care.
According to the usual analogy, foster care agencies have
the same limits and obligations as natural adult parents, but here, an
145
additional obligation is placed on the state.
Many young parents do not have the information, education, or
experience necessary to be good parents and depend on the state to provide
146
those resources to them.
The child welfare system often sets up teenage
mothers for failure by not providing emotional support, information on
147
parenting, and adequate preparation for independent living.
Federal law

140
141
142

143

144
145

146
147

Bonagura, supra note 1 at 186–87 (describing New York’s approach to minor children in
its care and its role as parens patriae).
Id. at 188–89.
See 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2006); Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21–22 (App. Div. 1986)
(affirming a successful claim on the part of former foster youth that the state held a duty
to provide them services and that failure to teach appropriate independent living skills
resulted in harmful outcomes, such as homelessness).
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 199–200 (1989)
for a discussion of when the state has a duty to protect a child from reasonably
foreseeable harm.
45 C.F.R § 1357.15 (2002).
Bonagura argues that, outside federal law, even though the baby may not be in the care
of the state, it is an affirmative duty of the state to protect the parenting ward as a child in
its care and an implicit duty to protect the baby, so the foster care agency should provide
the resources necessary for the mother and child to thrive as a unit. Bonagura, supra note
1, at 183.
Id.
Katz, supra note 81, at 536–37.
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requires foster care agencies to provide Independent Living Services and
Independent Living Plans to children in foster care over sixteen years old to
148
When
help them transition to living on their own once they leave care.
the child receiving Independent Living Services is also a parent, it would be
most helpful for her future success if her plan encompassed services that
149
would enable her to care for her child independently.
Those types of
services could include child care to allow the young mother to pursue an
education, drug and alcohol treatment, a job search, or vocational
150
training.
In the case of parenting wards, successfully living on their own
includes independently caring for a child, so they are entitled to services
that will result in that success.

B. State’s Duty to Prevent Harm and Protect Child Welfare
“Because parenting wards are in the care and custody of the state, the
151
state has an affirmative duty to protect them . . . .”
By contrast, when the
baby lives with the parenting ward and is not a dependent child themselves,
under DeShaney v. Winnebago County, the foster care agency does not have a
152
duty to protect the baby.
DeShaney holds that a foster care agency only has
a duty to protect children in its care (children adjudicated dependent) from
153
harm that is reasonably foreseeable.
The babies of parenting wards are
not automatically in the state’s care as dependent children, so the state can
deny responsibility for preventing any foreseeable harm to the young
154
child.
Though it goes against natural sensibilities, the agency has no
obligation to protect the baby and there are no legal ramifications for
refusal to help the baby.
The state, “as the caretaker of foster children and the enforcer of child
welfare laws, . . . has a heightened duty to families of parenting wards before
155
and after removal proceedings begin.”
Child welfare agencies should be
responsible for situations where harm to the baby was caused by the agency’s
own failures, which occurs most often when a parenting ward has an

148
149
150
151
152
153

154
155

42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(D) (2006).
Katz, supra note 81, at 551.
Id.
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194 (emphasis in original).
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 199–200 (1989)
(explaining that state’s duty to protect only arises after it has exerted some control).
The Deshaney Court did not want the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to be construed as holding the state accountable for reasonably foreseeable harm to all
children. Id. at 199–200.
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194.
Id. at 176.
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156

If the source of the maltreatment is
inappropriate foster care placement.
outside of the mother’s control, there does not seem to be a compelling
state interest to interfere with her rights. The welfare of the baby may have
been compromised, but the source of the harm should be responsible for
the harm.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Young mothers in foster care face infringements that provide two types
of constitutional claims: due process and equal protection. Due process is
implicated because the right to family integrity is a fundamental right, and
unjust intrusion into the sphere of parenthood requires due process
157
analysis.
Equal protection issues are raised when parenting wards are
158
treated differently than other types of mothers.
Though the child welfare agency may not always overtly prohibit a
parenting practice or require certain actions by the young mother, the
nature of foster care placements puts undue limitations on a parenting
ward’s decisions. A parenting ward may also face unjustified separation
from her child due to removal of the baby without a finding of abuse or
neglect, separation of the mother and baby after birth, inappropriate
placements, the scrutiny of mandated reporters, and the pressure on young
mothers to “voluntarily” place their children into care.
The last section of this Part explores the possible equal protection claims
arising from the heightened scrutiny in foster care placements and
differential treatment of parenting wards in court proceedings. A young
mother in care faces a lower threshold for removal of her children as well as
standards of care and fitness that are difficult to meet due to her age and
status as a foster child.

A. Due Process Implications
The circumstances of foster care result in rigorous scrutiny of parenting
wards’ behaviors, and this scrutiny often produces allegations against young
mothers for child maltreatment. In the United States, roughly half of all
156

157
158

Id. at 194–95. Bonagura also presents an interesting argument that the state has a duty to
the baby as a third party based on the law of torts. Id. at 187 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965)). Since, under tort law, “a custodial parent has a duty
to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm caused to a third party by his or her child,” the
state has an implied duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm by its child, the ward, to
a third party, the baby. Id. Bonagura posits that this includes a duty to provide an
environment in which a parenting foster child can safely and effectively parent, so as not
to cause harm to the baby, the third party. Bonagura, supra note 1, at 187.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 792, 794–97.
Id. at 668.

1246

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:4
159

When young
teen mothers are investigated for child maltreatment.
mothers are parenting wards who live with mandatory reporters and
confront biases within the system, the numbers are likely higher.
When the state unjustly interferes with a young mother’s right to control
the care or custody of her baby, she faces due process violations. This Part
will examine unjust interferences with both parenting wards’ care of their
children and the custody of their children.

1. Interference With Parenting Practices
Foster care agencies have a duty not only to protect the parenting wards
160
but “not to impinge on their parental rights.”
Despite the theoretical
protection of family integrity, parenting wards have little flexibility in how to
raise their children due to strict rules in the foster care system, such as
curfews, leave restrictions, limitations on visitors, and mandatory feeding
161
schedules.
In practice, the state often utilizes its parental role to dictate
matters inherently part of the young mother’s fundamental right to parent
her child, such as whether she can breast-feed or when she can take the baby
162
to the doctor.
163
For example, Joelle had her baby with her while she was in care. One
night her baby got very sick, and Joelle wanted to take the baby to the
hospital. However, the supervisors in her group home said she would have
to wait until the next morning because it was past curfew. The situation
required a judgment call that Joelle, as the baby’s mother, was entitled to
make; she never should have been prohibited from taking actions she
believed to be in her child’s best interests. In the end, Joelle made the
decision to take her child to the hospital, and as a result, she was kicked out
of her group home. These types of rules and restrictions limit a minor’s
ability to parent and are infringements on family integrity. Parenting
decisions, regardless of the mother’s status as a ward of the state, are
protected by her right to family integrity unless she is found to be unfit.

159
160
161

162
163

CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 6.
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194.
See YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, for several different accounts from parenting
wards that detail specific rules on bottle feeding and limitations on how often babies
could see their fathers, in addition to other rules that infringe on the mothers’ parenting.
Id. at 8, 31–33.
“Joelle” is a pseudonym. This story came from a conversation with a former foster youth
in Philadelphia.
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2. Inappropriate Separation
When a young mother is separated from her child for any reason except
to protect the baby’s safety, it is an interference with her right to control the
custody of her child. Parenting wards face several types of inappropriate
separations: when the baby is placed into foster care simply because the
mother is a minor, when the mother is awaiting an appropriate placement
for both her and the baby after birth, when the mother is coerced to
“voluntarily” place the baby into care, when circumstances of the placement
are held against the mother, and when mandated reporters overly scrutinize
her behavior.
a.

Unjustified Removal of the Baby

Over and over again, young girls report that they were unlawfully
separated from their children at birth without any allegations of abuse or
164
neglect.
Despite provisions and the explicit position of the federal
government that the mother and baby should be placed together after birth,
many agencies immediately place the babies into foster care after they are
born, disregarding the fundamental interest of young mothers to retain
165
custody of their children and sidestepping all of the protections in place.
In fact, many states are not even aware that Title IV-E funds can be leveraged
166
to aid the babies of young mothers in their care.
For many agencies, the
motivation behind placing the babies into foster care is to receive separate
funding for the baby. Ironically, these actions are actually grounds for the
agency to stop receiving federal reimbursements for the baby.

164
165

166

YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, at 8.
See R.F. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 740 So.2d. 1093, 1095 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)
(“[T]his case does not involve neglect or child abuse by the mother. In fact, the record
indicates that the mother has expressed only love and concern for her child and that the
child was placed in [state] custody solely because the mother herself had been placed in
foster care . . . .”); In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d 796, 799 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (stating
that when an eleven-year-old girl in foster care gave birth, only her age was listed as the
reason she could not care for her child); In re Inez, 704 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Mass. 1999)
(explaining that the state took custody of a child immediately following birth based on a
teen mother’s history of running away from her foster placements); In re Brown, No.
293045, 2010 WL 481025, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (explaining that the state
filed a removal petition because the teen mother was in foster care with too little income
to obtain her child’s medication); In re Interest of Hall, 703 A.2d 717, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997) (“The apparent reason for the action on the part of [the state] to adjudicate the
child dependent was that K.A.H. was born to a minor child who herself was adjudicated
dependent.”).
See generally Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 5–6 & n.11, for a survey of four states
that illustrates the low level of attention afforded to the parenting ward population,
regardless of the possible funding implications.
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Agencies have concerns about the possible harm young mothers may
cause when the baby resides with the young mother in placement, but the
agency does not have any supervisory authority. Placing the baby under the
supervision of the foster care agency allows the provider to intervene on
behalf of the baby when necessary. However, under DeShaney, foster care
agencies are not legally responsible to children not under their supervision,
167
so any liability concerns are unfounded.
b. Separation After Birth
Part of the problem may be that the law only requires joint placement
after birth but makes no recommendations on where the pregnant teen
should be placed before birth. Pregnant wards spend much of their
pregnancy in a temporary placement waiting to find out where they will be
placed after the baby arrives and then experience separation from the baby
after the birth while the agency searches for an appropriate placement for
168
them both.
Since there is a shortage of mother-child placements,
169
including both foster families and group homes, finding an appropriate
placement can take several weeks. During the wait, the baby remains in the
hospital, separated from her mother, and at considerable cost to the foster
care agency, and the mother and baby may have to go to the first-available
170
placement instead of a placement that suits them best.
c. Pressure to Voluntarily Place the Baby
One of the most concerning issues young mothers in care encounter is
“voluntary” separation as a result of coercive measures used to pressure
171
parenting wards to give up their children.
Foster parents, social workers,
or staff in group homes may exert pressure on parenting wards to place their
babies in care or may even use threats of maltreatment allegations to get
172
mothers to comply.
In Illinois, social workers were using threats of false
reports of abuse and neglect to pressure the parenting ward to cooperate
with placement or to punish them for complaining about the quality of

167
168
169
170
171

172

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 202; Katz, supra note 81, at 550.
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 202.
YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, at 23–26.
See Bonagura, supra note 1, at 181–82, for discussion of a situation in New York where
mothers may have to give up their children due to a lack of available services and
funding. The relinquishment is considered “voluntary,” but it is not actually a result of
the mother’s free will and volition.
Id. at 182.
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173

The problem in Illinois was demonstrated by the
placement services.
numbers; over a five year period, the number of parenting teens in care de174
creased as the number of children removed increased.
Illinois remedied
the problem of social workers using coercive measures through remedial
175
legislation.
In Florida, the problem of coercion was manifested as a
pattern of removing children of teen wards just as the young mother was
176
about to age out of foster care.
Accusations of abuse and neglect were
177
often initiated by foster parents who wanted to retain care of the baby.
Social workers and foster parents, acting vicariously as the state, who
coerce mothers to place their children into foster care are inappropriately
meddling with their rights to the companionship and care of their child. If
the young mother decided to sign her baby into care “voluntarily,” she likely
did not come to that decision on her own and would not have done so
without the internal and external pressures of her placement.
d. Placement-Created Problems
Even when the mother and child are finally placed together, there may
not be appropriate provisions in the home for a parenting ward and her
baby, like an age-appropriate bed, and money is usually not provided for the
178
young mother to secure the necessary food and clothing for her baby.
These types of inappropriate living conditions and lack of resources for the
parenting ward and her child would be considered abuse or neglect if they
179
happened in the home of the natural adult parents.
When they occur in
the foster home, the agency does not accept liability; instead, these
180
circumstances are cited against the young mothers as neglect.
It is highly
problematic for the foster care system to create inappropriate home
environments, compromising the welfare of the baby, and then to hold the
young mother accountable.

173
174
175
176
177
178

179
180

See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 21–23 (noting that threats by foster care staff may
be more widespread than previously imagined).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 25 (evaluating operating procedures of the Florida Department of Children and
Families).
Id.
Since few states appropriately utilize Title IV-E funds to provide financial support for the
baby, it is the young mother’s responsibility to buy food, diapers, and clothing. See
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 183–86 (telling the story of Ariella, who is highlighted in the
introduction of this Comment).
Id. at 188.
Id.
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Parenting wards may also be responsible for the lack of resources
181
provided by the foster care agency, or other situations that are beyond the
minor’s control. Parenting wards should only be held responsible for abuse
and neglect of their children that directly results from their actions or
situations within their control; to hold them responsible otherwise is a
violation of their right to family integrity and an unwarranted intrusion of
the state.
e. Mandated Reporters in the Home
Another obstacle unique to parenting wards is that they often live in
182
group homes or facilities with mandated reporters.
Mandated reporters
are required by law to report actions of the young mother or circumstances
that may threaten the welfare of the baby. The culture of the placements
can also be highly problematic for parenting wards and threaten their right
to family integrity. Young mothers in foster care often live with staff
members, caseworkers, and foster parents who are willing to get authorities
involved, so they are more likely to be over-scrutinized and less likely to have
183
a chance to learn from their mistakes.
Parenting wards are often reported for actions that could be considered
“normal” teenage behavior where their child is not harmed or facing threat
184
185
of harm.
Although missing curfew or AWOLing may be rebellious
behaviors that break the rules and require punishment, these behaviors do
186
not rise to the level of abuse, neglect, or even threat of harm.
Though
leaving the baby for a period of time under any circumstances may be
considered a threat of harm to the baby, taking the baby to a doctor of the
mother’s choosing or attending an appointment when she is not allowed to
be off campus can result in initiation of proceedings against the young
187
mother even though she is not leaving the child unattended.
If a
parenting ward engages in typical teenage behaviors or breaks the rules of
her placement while ensuring her child is safe, the state has no grounds to
infringe on her rights to the care and custody of her baby.

181
182
183
184
185

186
187

Id.
Horwitz, supra note 16, at 426.
Id. at 426–27.
See the full discussions and stories throughout Horwitz, supra note 16. These types of
stories are common anecdotes told by former foster youth and child advocate attorneys.
“AWOL” is a military term meaning “absent without leave,” but it is used in foster care
when a child runs away from or leaves placement without authorization. See MARNI
FINKELSTEIN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, YOUTH WHO CHRONICALLY AWOL FROM
FOSTER CARE: WHY THEY RUN, WHERE THEY GO, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 1 (2004).
Horwitz, supra note 16, at 421.
Id.
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There are two types of due process problems parenting wards encounter:
limitations on their ability to care for their children and improper
interference with maintaining the custody of their children. The varying
layers of infringements demonstrate the young mothers’ struggle to
maintain family autonomy while living in foster care.

B. Equal Protection Claims
Disparate treatment between young mothers who are in care and all
other mothers, both adults and teens not in foster care, raises possible equal
protection claims. Young mothers in foster care are impacted differently
when it comes to both the care and custody of their children. Under an
equal protection analysis, two similarly situated groups cannot be treated
differently without appropriate justification by the state, especially when a
188
fundamental interest is at stake.
There is no appropriate justification for
treating teen mothers in foster care differently than other mothers. This
Part will explore both the differential treatment of young mothers that arises
from the foster care placement and differential treatment in dependency
court proceedings.

1. In Foster Care Placement
If the level of scrutiny a young mother in the foster care system faces is
not the same as it is for all other parents, she has an equal protection claim
when the different treatment is not justified. Other mothers, regardless of
age, do not face coercion to “voluntarily” place their children into care.
Other mothers are not held responsible for inappropriate placements or
failures of case workers—circumstances outside of their control that result in
violations of their right to family integrity. Parenting wards live with
mandated reporters, and they would not face the same level of scrutiny of
their everyday lives if they were not in a foster placement, so young mothers
end up penalized for being in foster care. The state should simulate the role
of natural parents and apply the same level of scrutiny to parenting wards as
to other parents so as not to disadvantage teen parents placed in its care.
Parenting wards are also penalized for being teenagers when typical
189
teenage behaviors are held against them. In such situations, it seems clear
188
189

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 668, 675.
This unwarranted punishment may be a more widespread problem that falls outside the
scope of this Comment. For instance, older foster youth may be heavily penalized for
smoking marijuana or skipping school—behaviors, which while not acceptable, are
typical amongst teenagers. However, the ramifications for foster youth engaging in these
behaviors are more severe than for teenagers outside the dependency system. Foster
youth may face the removal of services, a new placement, or an increase in the restrictive
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that if the parenting ward were a parent in any other context, her actions
would not be held against her in a maltreatment investigation. If an adult
parent or a non-ward teenage mother arranged for a babysitter and went out
for the evening, it would be considered completely appropriate behavior. If
a non-ward parent engaged in typical teenage rule-breaking and broke
curfew while ensuring her child was safe, the state would have no grounds to
infringe on her rights.
It is not acceptable for a young mother to be held responsible for the
failings of the foster care system when other mothers are not subject to the
same liabilities. It is also not acceptable for the same actions to have
different ramifications for parenting wards than they do for other mothers.
The threshold for removal of a parenting ward’s baby should not be lowered
because she is in foster care.

2. In Dependency Proceedings
Young mothers start their journey as parents at a disadvantage because
achieving the standard of fitness requires more work and perseverance than
is required of adult parents. The minor is held to the same standards as
adult parents but not given the same freedoms and ability to parent. This is
true with regard to the limited access minors have to necessary resources like
housing, employment, and welfare benefits discussed earlier, but it is
especially true in the foster care setting when placement rules often severely
limit the ability of parenting wards to make decisions regarding the
upbringing of their children. These disadvantages make it more likely that
the young mothers’ rights to family integrity will be infringed upon or
severed; parenting wards do not have the same chances of success as adult
parents or young parents in natural homes.
When a minor parent faces allegations that she abused or neglected her
own child, there are some judges who are quick to validate the allegations
190
due to the parent’s status as a ward of the state.
This ultimately holds
parenting wards to a different threshold for validating allegations of
maltreatment than all other parents because the decision is not based on a
showing of abuse or neglect. A minor’s status as a ward alone is not
evidence that she committed maltreatment. If the proceedings progress to a

190

level of care. Youth outside the system may only face a citation. Due to the nature of
foster care and the struggle of agencies to provide education, vocational training, and
assistance in housing applications, foster youth may be held to higher expectations—with
higher stakes—than youth outside of care.
See Bonagura, supra note 1, at 177–78 (describing a problem in New York Family Courts
that agencies responsible for parenting wards “take a policing approach . . . that is
adversarial and punitive, rather than supportive, educational, and preventative” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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termination hearing, severing the right to family autonomy is based on
unfitness. The court should apply the same standards of safety and fitness to
parenting wards as to other parents so as not to disadvantage young mothers
in foster care. Children should absolutely be protected from abuse and
neglect at the hands of their parents, and courts should not institute a lower
threshold for the baby’s welfare due to the mother’s age, but the threshold
for government intrusion into the family unit should be adjusted so one
group of parents is not at a greater risk of governmental intrusion than
another.
The equal protection problems arising from foster care placements and
in dependency court proceedings go hand-in-hand with the due process
considerations. While in placement, young mothers are treated differently
than all other mothers. This differential treatment results in unjust
interference with their ability to parent and oftentimes with their ability to
retain custody of their children. Once the baby is removed, parenting wards
face different standards in court proceedings that place them at a greater
likelihood for the ultimate infringement of their parental rights:
termination.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Two things are clear: (1) young mothers have full rights to parent their
children as they see fit, and (2) the ability to fully exercise that right is
inhibited by their age and often by their status as a ward of the state. Instead
of curtailing the rights of minor parents to family integrity under the
traditional framework of adolescent rights, the Court has nominally given
young mothers full parental rights. In practice, though, young mothers are
not fully able to realize their parental rights. Family integrity is dangled like
a carrot on a stick in front of minor parents, a goal they may never fully be
able to achieve. Allowing adolescents to be adults in the context of
parenting is uncomfortable to many individuals, causing the state to respond
with paternalism and penalization. In the current structure of adolescent
rights, granting full rights of parenthood to “kids” may seem
counterintuitive, especially since there are limits both on the minor’s
parenting resources and the adult parent’s ability to intervene.
To solve some of these problems, the state could infringe on minors’
rights to family integrity under the “conditional curtailment” test. If minors
fulfill the first prong of the test and are sufficiently mature, young mothers
could be granted full adult rights that allow access to necessary resources.
The process would be like granting majority status to young mothers on a
conditional basis after they demonstrate maturity. If the minor parent does
not fulfill the maturity prong, the state could curtail her right to family
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integrity and obligate the natural adult parents or the state to provide
additional support to the young mother.
To address the problems with removal and assessing parental fitness in
court proceedings, states should model the legislation put in place by
California or adopt New York’s family court standards.

A. Curtailing Rights Under the “Conditional Curtailment” Test
There is proper justification for the infringing on a young mother’s right
to family integrity by analyzing minor parents’ rights through the existing
framework of adolescent rights. Minors’ rights would receive greater
protection from the adolescent rights framework under the “conditional
curtailment” test than by providing provisional rights to family integrity
without means to protect young mothers from unjust infringement.
Whether the young mother is mature enough to make life-altering
decisions varies by age and individual. Deciding whether or not an
expectant mother is mature enough to make the life-altering decision to
have a child would require individualized assessment. The two-part analysis
of the “conditional curtailment” test would allow a mature mother to
preserve her right to family integrity without interference from her parents
or the state, but neither her parents nor the state would be obligated to
provide additional guidance or support. This process of deciding which
mothers meet the maturity prong could mirror or build upon the case-bycase analysis that happens through the judicial bypass procedures with
191
abortion.
If an expectant mother is not mature enough to make life-altering
decisions like the decision to have a child, fulfilling the first prong of the
analysis, the adult parents or the state would be obligated to guide the
decision-making processes of their pregnant child. This would not allow a
parent to force her child to have an abortion or give the baby up for
192
adoption, but would give the adult parents a voice in weighty decisions
and allow the natural parents to help guide their child’s parenting practices.
The curtailment affords the adult parents full protection of their rights to
family autonomy and places on them an obligation—as in other contexts
where there is a gap between the rights afforded to minors and the rights
afforded upon majority—to act in their daughter’s best interest and provide
191

192

But see Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 561
(2000) (arguing against an intermediate classification and approach that confers adult
legal rights or responsibilities based on individualized assessments of maturity because it
is too costly and burdensome).
The state has an interest in the young mother carrying her child to term, and the
decision to have a family is also protected under the right to family integrity, though it
falls outside the scope of this Comment.

Apr. 2013]

FOSTERING MOTHERHOOD

1255

the resources and support necessary for her to parent her child. This
obligation could include being the payee for welfare benefits for both their
daughter and the baby, providing appropriate housing, ensuring the young
mother has proper medical care, and helping the teenager navigate her new
role as a parent. Allowing the curtailment of rights based on the immaturity
of the teen mother would especially benefit very young mothers who have
the least access to resources and need the most help. Young mothers ages
eleven, twelve, or thirteen cannot drive let alone secure the monetary
resources required to be the primary provider for their children.
If a minor qualifies as mature and thus infringement is not justified, the
mature minor could be given the full rights of majority upon becoming a
parent. This goes beyond emancipating minors and includes actually
allowing them to enter into contracts, make medical decisions, receive
public assistance checks, and in all other ways engage in the legal aspects of
life as if they were adults. If there is not a concern about a minor’s ability to
make rational, mature, and informed decisions, granting her these rights
should not pose serious problems. If young parents are afforded rights, and
there is no justification for infringing upon them, they should be given the
vehicles to access and realize their rights. The most reasonable and effective
way to do that is to expand their rights in other arenas.
The two-part analysis would justify the restrictions placed on minors’
parenting by foster care placements if the young parent meets the
immaturity requirement. These restrictions bring affirmative obligations on
the agency to provide any resources the young mother needs to effectively
parent. Just as with the natural adult parents when the adolescent rights are
curtailed, the obligation to fill any gaps, guide the decision-making process,
and provide resources to the young mother carries over to the state.
Assistance would include things like parenting classes, financial support to
help provide for the baby, and appropriate housing accommodations.
There is a benefit of curtailment that might be appealing to parenting
wards who are mature enough to make long-term decisions and for whom
infringement is not justified. There could be an option for a mature parent
to opt out of her full rights in order to receive the benefits of state resources.
With the “conditional curtailment” test, the foster care agency would need a
finding of the parenting ward’s immaturity to justify intrusion into the
minor’s parenting practices, but the minor could waive her full right to
family integrity to reap the benefits of additional support and resources.
While actively infringing on a fundamental right is greatly prohibited, an
individual could elect to have her rights infringed upon to reap a benefit.
Infringement and the obligation to provide additional assistance go hand-inhand—the agency cannot infringe on the parenting ward’s rights without
providing additional assistance to be effective parents, but the additional
assistance is not required without infringement. While there may be some
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concern about foster care workers coercing young mothers to curtail their
rights, the curtailment comes with an added burden on the state that should
curb undue influence. This may also mean that child welfare agencies may
begin engaging in a balancing test to determine if limiting a parenting
ward’s ability to control the upbringing of her children is worth the price of
additional assistance the agency will be obligated to provide.

B. Legislation and Court Standards to Remedy Infringements on Minors’
Right to Family Integrity
Beyond offering services pursuant to the “conditional curtailment” test,
there are legislative measures that states can take to protect the rights of
parenting wards. California has legislation to protect parenting wards from
some of the problems they face in foster care, and New York’s court rules
provide protections for parents who are minors. In addition, child welfare
agencies could more effectively carry out the federal mandate for
Independent Living Services.
The state of California recently passed legislation specifically addressing
the problems young mothers face in the foster system: the increased
likelihood of removal, reduced access to traditional support systems
available to other minor and first-time parents, unrealistic expectations of
parenting wards inconsistent with their age and development, and shortages
in placements resulting in separation and thus disrupting the parent-child
193
bond. At the very least, all states should accept measures like these to cure
the problems and inequalities that parenting wards face.
Proceedings should be adjusted so the law impacts all mothers equally.
This would require the court to take into account the complications of a
parenting ward’s placement, removal of biases in court proceedings, and
standards of parental fitness that young mothers can achieve given the
resources available to them. In New York, the parent’s age must be taken
194
into account in determining whether there has actually been neglect. The
rationale is that a minor cannot be expected to provide the standard of care
for their child as well as an adult parent; the minor “cannot be penalized for
195
not acting like an adult.”
This may make it seem that minors have a lower
threshold of care and fitness to meet than adult parents, but in reality, it
adjusts the standard to meet the level of care a minor can reasonably be
expected to provide.
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Teen Parents in Foster Care Act § 2, S.B. 1178, 2004 Cal. Stat. c. 841.
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 214.
Id. (citing In re Lawrence Children, 768 N.Y.S.2d 83, 92 (Fam. Ct. 2003)).
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In In re Barnett, a minor parent’s rights were terminated, in part because
196
While the court normally took lack of
she could not obtain employment.
employment into consideration when terminating an adult parent’s rights,
197
the court overturned the termination after considering the minor’s age.
More courts should factor these kinds of considerations into their decisions.
A minor should not be considered “unfit” for not providing housing when
they cannot sign a lease or for not purchasing appropriate clothes when they
cannot get benefits and are not eligible for employment. Adults, however,
have access to those resources and therefore can be held accountable for
not providing them. Adjusting the standard of care does not adjust the
showing of “clear and convincing evidence” that must be demonstrated for a
finding of parental unfitness; it merely changes the type of evidence that
demonstrates parental unfitness.

CONCLUSION
The interests of the young child are protected when the minor’s rights
are protected; babies would benefit from the certainty and consistency of
198
remaining in their mother’s care.
“[R]emoval without a true attempt to
rehabilitate the minor parent or address any of the issues causing concern
perpetuates a cycle of removal and does harm to all of the parties
199
involved.”
If the minor’s parenting practices are the “issues causing
concern” that lead to removal, “rehabilitating” the issues requires
restructuring minors’ rights to family integrity to either (1) obligate the
adult parent or state to provide additional assistance to the young parent, or
(2) increase her access to adult rights. If the issues that lead to removal are
outside of the young mother’s control and are instead violations of her
constitutional rights, immediate remedies to eliminate or alleviate the
problems would serve both the minor mother and the baby. The positive
policy implications of these measures are resounding: not only would
rethinking the structure of minor parents’ rights and preventing
constitutional violations help stop the cycle of foster care, but the babies
would greatly benefit from these changes.
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In re Barnett, 450 A.2d 1356, 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
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Buss, supra note 19, at 829.
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